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THIS IS A LATE DRAFT. IF YOU WISH TO QUOTE OR CITE THIS 
PAPER PLEASE CHECK THE PUBLISHED VERSION.  
 
Moral Inquiry and Mob Psychology1 
1.  
Some people have thought that there is a power of intuition by which we have a priori 
knowledge of self-evident moral truths.  Bernard Williams in Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy writes of this view: 
This model of intuition in ethics has been demolished by a succession of critics, and 
the ruins of it that remain above ground are not impressive enough to invite much 
history of what happened to it.2  
:LOOLDPV¶FRQILGHQWXVHRIWKHDFKLHYHPHQWZRUG³GHPROLVKHG´ZLOOSURYRNHGLVDJUHHPHQW
from some.  Some people still accept this picture.3 I do not but I have nothing here to add to 
what has already been said in criticism of it.4  
Some people think moral knowledge is just empirical knowledge. If what makes actions 
morally eligible is that they make people happy, then moral inquiry is just the business of 
investigation into what makes people happy. If. Trouble is, saying what makes actions 
PRUDOO\HOLJLEOHLVWKDWWKH\PDNHSHRSOHKDSS\GRHVQ¶Witself look much like an empirical 
claim so this kind of very strong naturalism looks unpromising.5 
$QRWKHUYLHZ,¶PJRLQJWRSXWWRRQHVLGH here is what Allan Gibbard calls ³PRUDO
ORJLFLVP´.6 This is the view that Hare was expressing when he claimed it was possible to 
derive the substantive content of morality with no more starting out kit than, as he put it, 
³ORJLFDQGWKHIDFWV´7.  This too is a view some people still accept. Gibbard himself attributes 
a version of it to Christine Korsgaard.8 But I do not believe it and will not discuss it here.  
6RLIZHGRQ¶W± either literally or by analogy - MXVWVHHLWDQGLIZHFDQ¶WMXVWILJXUHLWRXW, 
how on earth is moral inquiry supposed to proceed? The orthodox answer here is to appeal to 
what John Rawls characterised as the method of reflective equilibrium.9 The term was not 
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new. He took it over from Nelson *RRGPDQ¶VZRUNRQORJLFDQGDSSOLHGLWWRHWKLFV1RU
ZHUH5DZOV¶PHWKRGRORJLFDOLGHDVspecifically about ethics especially new. As he himself 
observes, they express an approach quite similar to that Aristotle appears to favour in the 
Nicomachean Ethics.10 %XW5DZOV¶VPHWKRGRORJLFDOGLVFXVVLRQLVHVSHFLDOO\ULFKDQGKDVEHHQ
especially influential.  
We start with considered judgements. These are roughly the same features of our moral 
phenomenology which earlier philosophers called ³intuitions´. They differ however from 
what some contemporary moral psychologicists like to call ³intuitions´, which are raw, 
unreflective moral gut reactions. Whereas Rawlsian considered judgements are just that: 
considered. Stable. Reflectively endorsed. Rawls moreover imposes a number of filters on 
which considered judgements are eligible as inputs to the pursuit of reflective equilibrium. 
Those we are hesitant about or lack confidence in; those we make when we are upset or 
frightened; those where our own interests are implicated.11 
The central virtue the reflective equilibrium, as I think it best understood, can attribute to a 
considered judgement is that of being stable under reflection.12 7KDW¶VZK\MXGJHPHQWVPDGH
ZKHQZHDUHIULJKWHQHGRUXSVHWGRQ¶WFRXQWXQOHVVZHFRQWLQue to stand by them when we 
are relaxed and have calmed down.  Similarly if we learn about ourselves that we tend to 
make different judgements about certain questions because the questions are set in different 
contexts, are differently framed, that is something we need to focus some reflective attention 
on  in seeking to arrive at a stance we are prepared to stick to across such changes. Stability 
under refection indeed GRHVQ¶WMXVWPRWLYDWHWKHILOWHUVRQLQSXWMXGJHPHQWV,WODUJHO\
constitutes the method itself. For the winning judgements are those that stand up to reflective 
scrutiny , i.e. those that are stable under reflection where reflection is reflection in the light of 
other judgements we hold, and in particular those that themselves prove to be stable under 
reflection.  
Such scrutiny pursues coherence by identifying and seeking to resolve tensions between the 
judgements we are disposed to make. If I find utilitarianism very plausible but am not 
inclined to think it ever acceptable to kill someone to harvest their organs, there is an 
apparent tension between my general theoretical beliefs and my more particular beliefs about 
cases. I either need to make a credible case that the tension is merely apparent or something 
will have to give. Or there may be tensions between relatively particular beliefs. If I think it 
wrong to kill someone to save several people by harvesting the organs of the former; but I 
GRQ¶WWhink it is wrong to secure the same result by the sort of threat-deflection that happens 
when we turn trolleys, but I can give no credible principled reason able to withstand critical 
scrutiny why there should be a difference, then I find myself under dialectical pressure to  
revise some of what I believe.  Our judgements should survive the kind of argument-driven 
scrutiny that made Socrates so unpopular in certain quarters. Justice does not require one to 
return a weapon to a friend who has lost his mind. So justice is not simply speaking the truth 
and returning what one has borrowed. We throw a proposal out when we see it has 
consequences we cannot accept.13 
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Our judgements should also survive scrutiny in the light of such empirical knowledge as is 
supplied by an understanding of history and the human sciences. To survive this they must 
often survive scrutiny in the light of knowledge of their causal origins. Considered moral 
judgements perhaps do not have the sort of vindicating explanations enjoyed by some 
judgements of other kinds where what explains them is their own truth but some still survive 
causal explanation better than others. The explanation of why humans care so much about the 
welfare of children, especially our own, is probably rather a lot to do with our being 
mammals who have offspring in small numbers but ensure that a good number survive by 
loving and nurturing them. Other creatures have very large numbers of offspring who are all 
left to fend for themselves, a small number getting lucky in making it through the very 
dangerous period of unprotected early development. If we were creatures of the latter kind  
we would have had very different moral sensibilities. More simply, if we were not social 
animals our normative sensibilities would be unrecognizably different. But my fondness for 
children and my interest in their welfare easily survive this understanding. Whereas if I learn 
that my odd feeling of moral disturbance at the fact that you often cycle to work is the result 
of my having been manipulated by post-hypnotic suggestion to feel disgust whenever I 
HQFRXQWHUVHQWHQFHVZLWKWKHZRUG³RIWHQ´LQWKHP, I would surely revise the judgement or at 
least withdraw reflective endorsement from it.14 
There is a role too for imagination. Intelligent moral and political thinking requires some 
capacity to appreciate sympathetically the experiences of people whose experiences may be 
very much more difficult than, or just very different to, our own. And indeed to understand 
the moral and political perspectives of those whose moral and political perspectives are very 
different from our own, and to understand these in ways that allow us to engage 
constructively and sympathetically with them and not simply sanctimoniously denounce them 
to fellow members of our respective ideological tribes. Being engagingly articulate about our 
diverging experiences and values is an important a part of moral discourse as the construction 
of arguments. We often learn as much about ethics from works of imaginative literature as we 
do from the writings of moral philosophers.15  
Constructive and sympathetic mutual engagement matters because the pursuit of reflective 
equilibrium is not something I do by myself, not simply a matter of sitting in my armchair 
trying to sort my values, commitments and plans into a coherent package that might shape a 
life that will bear my survey.16 It is something that we do together seeking to arrive at shared 
moral understandings that can shape the moral communities we aspire together to make and 
sustain. We might not have been social animals but we are and, as such, we need not just to 
deliberate but to codeliberate, to deliberate together, seeking to reach shared understanding 
WKDWEHDUDOORXUVXUYH\V%\VD\LQJ³DOORXU VXUYH\V´,H[SUHVVKHUHDQDVSLUDWLRQWR
inclusivity that some might question, not because they do not share it (though some still do 
not) but because it seems to import substantive moral commitment into my account of moral 
epistemology. It does indeed, but I think that is entirely proper for reasons that I hope will be 
clear by the end of this article. 
2.   
But I would like to turn first to an interesting recent critique of reflective equilibrium found in 
7KRPDV.HOO\DQG6DUDK0F*UDWK¶Vimportant 2011 paper ³,V5HIOHFWLYH(TXLOLEULXP
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 Wheatley and Haidt, 2005. 6HHIXUWKHU/HQPDQI¶FRPLQJ 
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 The essays in Nussbaum 1992 makes an eloquent case for this. 
16
 Hume, 1740, book III, part III, section 6, paragraph 6. Cf. Tiberius 2008, Lenman 2009. 
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Enough?´17 The answer to the question in their title is, they argue, No. They begin by arguing 
that there is no unique reflective equilibrium that we can expect by way of output no matter 
what we stick in by way of input.  I¶PQRWFRQFHUQHGWRFRQWHVWWKDW)RULWWREHIDOVHZRXOG
be for formal coherence constraints to give us all we need, for a form of moral logicism to be 
true, and I am here assuming it is not.  
But given this dependence of what comes out on what goes in, Kelly and McGrath go on to 
argue, the method has no credibility at all unless we have some warrant, independent of the 
method of reflective equilibrium itself, to suppose the input judgements to have relatively 
high credibility. So there needs to be some way of ascertaining this that is not itself the 
method of reflective equilibrium. So the method of reflective equilibrium is not enough for 
moral inquiry to be possible. Unless there is some other way of making contact with moral 
reality. And indeed if there is some such other way of making contact with moral reality then 
reflective equilibrium may end up looking pretty otiose.  
,XVHUDWKHUUHDOLVWODQJXDJHKHUH$QGWKDWFRKHUHVZLWK.HOO\DQG0F*UDWK¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
of the method at this point in proceedings. At an early point in their paper they say, in 
discussing Rawls: 
Although a great deal of what Rawls says about reflective equilibrium suggests the 
descriptive interpretation, let us set it aside and concentrate on the deliberative 
interpretation, on which it is a procedure for figuring out what to believe, or the truth, 
about morality.18 
This distinction between deliberative and descriptive interpretations of reflective equilibrium 
LVGUDZQIURP6FDQORQ¶VSDSHURQ5DZOV¶PRUDOHSLVWHPRORJ\19 On the descriptive 
interpretation what the method does is clarify for us what we think, or perhaps even just what 
I think. It is an exercise in self-interpretation, as Rawls himself puts it, a kind of 
psychology.20 Whereas the deliberative method is an attempt to figure out not just what we, 
or I, think. It is an attempt at discovery of the moral truth.  
This distinction feels a little slippery to me. The labels ³deliberative´/´descriptive´ rather 
make it sound as if one project is merely descriptive while the other is normative, the project 
of determining what to do. The latter gets rather superimposed, certainly by Kelly and 
McGrath, on a conception of moral inquiry that is really quite robustly realist in taking it to 
be an attempt to determine the truth about a domain of moral reality that is prior to and 
independent of us and the interest we take it in and where this is not just the relatively 
deflationary truth and independence in which a quasi-realist might trade. 
But if we are not robust realists about moral inquiry, the game changes rather significantly. 
Let me quote here a brief passage from that thing of beauty WKDWLVFKDSWHURI:LOOLDPV¶
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.  
It is sometimes objected against the method of reflective equilibrium that the 
intuitions to which theory is being adjusted merely represent our local ethical beliefs, 
and that these may not be correct. When the enterprise is taken in the way I have 
described, this is not a relevant objection. The intuitions are supposed to represent our 
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 2010. The paper was published slightly later than the cover date.  
18
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ethical beliefs, because the theory being sought is one of ethical life for us, and the 
point is not that the intuitions should be in some ultimate sense correct, but that they 
should be ours.21 
:KDWGRHV:LOOLDPVKHUHPHDQE\³:KHQWKHHQWHUSULVHLVWDNHQLQWKHZD\,KDYH
GHVFULEHG´":KDW,WKLQNKHPHDQVLVZKHQZHFRQFHLYHRIWKHSURMHFWRIPRUDOLQTXLU\DV
concerned with the distinctively practical project of a group of people trying to arrive at an 
agreement about what moral understandings they might all be prepared to accept and to share 
and regulate their lives together by.  It is not the sort of theoretical project that science is 
engaged in. That, I think, is in a Rawlsian sprit and it is also, I think, dead right.  
We should not accept, it seems to me too sharp a distinction between description and 
deliberation.  Consider the following question. What sort of moral outlook that I might 
govern my life by might I be prepared happily to endorse at the level of highest order desires 
after sustained and careful reflection? That is a descriptive question. It is a question of self-
interpretation. It is a question about who I am and what is important to me.  But it is not a 
question inquiry into which is very deeply distinct from the activity of deliberation. Rather 
the two are continuous. (Continuous though not equivalent. No sort of reductionism is on 
RIIHU2QWKHWKLQQHVWUHDGLQJRI³PLJKW´WKHIRUHJRLQJTXHVWLRQLQYLWHVWhe answer, Any 
outlook you like. In that thin sense, pretty well anything might happen. On the much thicker 
UHDGLQJZHQHHG³PLJKW´LVDOUHDG\QRUPDWLYHDQGRXUTXHVWLRQQRPHUHTXHVWLRQRI
descriptive psychology, though still very emphatically a question about who I am and what is 
important to me.) 
I want to live my life in ways I can reflectively endorse, that will bear my survey, as Hume 
has it, and that will do this in a way that it stable, throughout my life. My wanting this is not 
rationally compulsory and is contingent.22 I might not have wanted it but it is quite a deep and 
important fact about me that I do and almost certainly this is true also of you.  This desire, the 
desire to live in ways I can accept and justify to myself, is the spur for reflection and 
deliberation. Moreover we want, you and I - do we not?  - to life lives together in moral 
community in ways that will bear our respective surveys, ways that we can all accept and 
justify to each other, and that is a spur for reflecting together and for codeliberation. This 
enterprise is what moral inquiry is and (the point is again precisely Rawlsian), it is 
fundamentally more akin to a political process of seeking agreement than to a scientific 
process of seeking understanding of some independent domain of reality. 23 
This is in large measure an interpretative project, a project of understanding who we are and 
what is important to us.24 Our judgements should survive broader philosophical reflection 
informed by a knowledge and understanding of the moral ideas of our own and other 
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 1985, p. 102.  
22
 Cf. Lenman 2009. 
23
 Thus in characterising his constructivist understanding of political justice, Rawls writes: 
The bases of this view lie in fundamental ideas of the public political culture as well 
DVLQFLWL]HQV¶VKDUHGSULQFLSOHVDQGconceptions of practical reason. Thus, if the 
procedure can be correctly formulated, citizens should be able to accept its principles 
and conceptions along with their reasonable comprehensive doctrine. (1993, p. 97) 
24
 On moral inquiry as self-interpretation cf. Hurley 1989, Taylor 1989, Scanlon 1992, 
Walzer 1993, Dworkin 2011.  
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traditions. The conversation about what moral understandings we can agree upon and share 
was not initiated by you and me in the last five minutes. It has gone on a long time and we are 
joining it very late at a point where very considerable progress has been made towards 
reaching shared understanding even if in ways that are often partial, plural and contested. So 
it is a conversation we have in the context of that long history and the place it has brought us 
to in terms of the moral culture we inhabit. In that sense it is true that there is something 
conservative about reflective equilibrium but it is not something that should trouble us. The 
point is simply that we cannot start from nowhere. We start from here. And to that extent too 
there can be no sharp distinction between self-interpretation and normative inquiry. As Susan 
Hurley put it: 
[W]e can determine ourselves, exercise our autonomy, in relation to given forms of 
life by depending on certain of them as the basis for criticism and revision of others; 
but we muct always occupy ourselves in the process. Self-determination does not 
involve detaching ourselves from the whole of what we are.25 
I think we might go further in demystifying moral epistemology by following Gibbard, 
Simon Blackburn26 and others into an expressivist turn. My robust intuition that murder is 
wrong is, I propose, best understood, at least at a first approximation, as an unwillingness on 
my part to accept as a body of moral rules regulating my community any body of such rules 
that permits murder. Unwillingness is a state of mind more closely affiliated to desire than to 
belief. A desire about the standards that should inform our moral community is not concerned 
with making contact with reality. Rather it is concerned to cohere with my other desires in 
ways that will bear my survey and those of my fellows. In saying murder is wrong I do not 
seek to describe some robustly real normative reality. Rather I express (though I do not of 
course report) something about me that you will need to engage with if you and I are to live 
together in moral community.  
 
It would be wrong to say simply that all moral judgements express our desires about what 
standards we would wish to inform our moral community. They also often express the 
standards that do inform it. This is, as I have noted, an old conversation. It has not just begun. 
It is also far from being over. It works towards an ideal equilibrium it will no doubt never 
attain ± perhaps should never attain insofar as reflection is itself a central human good. But 
we do not capitulate to a ludicrous conventionalism by acknowledging that our moral 
GLVFRXUVHGRHVQ¶WMXVWSRLQWDKHDGWRWKDWLGHD,WH[SUHVVHVZKHUHZHRXUPRUDOFRQYHUVDWLRQ
LVQRZ,QWKLVKRXVHZHGRQ¶WWDNHHDFKRWKHUV¶VWXIIZLWKRXWDVNLQJSHUPLVVLRQ,QWKLV
country we GRQ¶WWROHUDWHFUXHOW\WRZDUGFhildren. These are not exactly descriptions, 
generalizations inviting counter-examples. But they serve to affirm and express the standards 
we have already in place.  
 
I think that on this, broadly Humean, picture of moral inquiry27, Williams¶ retort suffices to  
evade the concern articulated by Kelly and McGrath. Indeed, all that concern perhaps comes 
to in the end is that the robust realist has a problem making good sense of moral 
epistemology that invoking reflective equilibrium ZRQ¶WIL[DQd that is not really news to 
many of us. However, while a turn away from robust realism makes the concern Kelly and 
McGrath raise abate, there is another concern which perhaps comes to the fore. 
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3 
My title, you will have observed, echoes the words of Imre Latakos in a famous discussion of 
Thomas Kuhn. Lakatos here airs the concern that the Kuhnian picture  of scientific change 
contrasted with the more reassuring picture painted by folk like Hempel and Popper, 
replacing what had seemed a description of an orderly rational process with a story about 
³PRESV\FKRORJ\´28 We think of science as a rational process by means of which scientists 
successfully track objective scientific truths that are prior to and independent of both 
scientists and science. But of course there is a strand in recent philosophy of science, 
RULJLQDWLQJZLWK.XKQ¶VStructure of Scientific Revolutions, that challenges this comfortable 
picture and offers explanations for scientific changes and developments from which 
vindicatory reference to any explanatory role for the truth of what scientists believe is 
alarmingly conspicuous by its absence. Such explanations indeed suggested sceptical 
conclusions about science which some philosophers seemed to embrace. If so that might 
seem to discredit science, to show that it is really just a fraud on the taxpayer and the 
taxpayer might as well close it down.  
,GRQ¶WP\VHOIHPEUDFHVXFK scepticism. I think science does track truths that are prior to and 
independent of both science and scientists. At least on a good day. No doubt there is always 
plenty of junk science about. But this paper is not about science and I have nothing to say 
here to defend this optimism. My concern is to address a reader who is thinking, OK you 
GRQ¶WWKLQNLWWUXHRIVFLHQFHWKDWUDWKHUWKDQWUDFNLQJVRPHSULRUDQGLQGHSHQGHQWWUXWKLWLW
is just mob psychology. But you do think moral inquiry fails to track any such independent 
reality6RGRHVQ¶WWKDWPHDQWKHUHLVQRWKLQJOHIWIRUPRUDOLQTXLU\WREHH[FHSWPRE 
psychology? In which case, LVQ¶t it likewise discredited? 
No. /HW¶VWKLQNIRUDPLQXWHDERXWWKHUKHWRULFal force here RIWKHWHUP³PRESV\FKRORJ\´,WV
use invokes a distinction we make between good and bad ways of forming and revising 
beliefs. Talk of mob psychology calls to mind the kind of phenomena described in Charles 
0DF.D\¶VFODVVLFExtraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, 
including such exemplary triumphs of unreason as financial bubbles, the mania that drove 
The Crusades and the witch trials of early modern Europe and America. The depressing 
phenomenon here is just the tendency people have when gathered together in large groups to 
do and to believe whatever everyone else does even if it is something quite mad. The 
phenomenon is perhaps even more depressing now than when MacKay was writing as the 
internet enables people to be members of crowd even when sitting alone at home in their 
pants in front of a computer. There is no longer any need to actually assemble.  
That is messed up. ,WLVPHVVHGXSLI,EHOLHYH3³6KH¶VDZLWFK´WKURXJKWKHNLQGRI
unreasoning epistemic contagion that can grip a mob. It is also messed up if I believe P 
because I think that will contribute to my popularity and make people like me. And it is 
messed up if I believe P because Comrade Stalin or Chairman Mao has declared that P is the 
case and that makes it really, really dangerous not to believe P. We think there are messed up 
ways to form beliefs and we think there are other ways that are not messed up. There are 
many ways to characterise the good ways. A popular one is in terms of epistemic virtues, 
virtues such as objectivity, open-mindedness, conscientiousness and a suitable degree of 
epistemic humility. 
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 Lakatos 1970, p. 178. 
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The worry here is that in ethics, if we are not robust realists, we may not be able to make this 
contrast at all.  We cannot simply say that the good ways of forming and revising beliefs are 
the ways that reliably track the moral truth while the bad ways do not. Well actually we sort 
of can if we are quasi-UHDOLVWVDQG,DP%XWZHFDQ¶WMXVWVD\LWThe thing with quasi-realism 
is ZHGRQ¶WJHW to help ourselves to truth at the outset. We have to explain how its invocation 
might PDNHVHQVHJLYHQRXUZKROHVDOHUHMHFWLRQRIWKHUREXVWUHDOLVW¶VPHWDSK\VLFDO
commitments. If that explanation succeeds we end up in a position to speak the way realists 
do. But we have to earn that position. I think this can be done here.  
,¶PQRWWKHILUVWSKLORVRSKHUWRZRUU\RQWKLVVFRUH9DOHULH7LEHULXVUHFHQWO\SXEOLVKHGDQ
H[FHOOHQWSDSHU³Open-Mindedness and NRUPDWLYH&RQWLQJHQF\´ZKHUHVKHDGGUHVVHVWKH
question how we can explain what she calls the legitimacy of epistemic virtues in a domain 
such as ethics as she understands it (where the way Tiberius understands the domain of ethics 
is as near as dammit the same as the way I do.) One thing she emphasizes there is that we 
make a decent bit of headway by paying attention to the extent to which moral and 
prosaically factual judgements are mutually entangled. An awful lot of what we are up to in 
out practical reasoning including our moral reasoning is prosaically factual, often 
instrumental, reasoning and there you just want to be able to track the truth. But we would 
like to be able to say more than this, making sense of such epistemic virtues even to the 
extent that our practical thought is not instrumental but concerned with what we are to take as 
important or as morally demanded of us in relatively basic ways. And, like Tiberius, I think 
we can.  
Let us think about what is surely a paradigm case of a messed up way to decide an issue. 
Trial by combat. Suppose that you and I have a dispute. You say I wronged you. I say no. 
There are things we could do. We could reason with each other. We could get a wise judge or 
a jury of our peers to arbitrate. These might all be sensible enough proposals. But here instead 
is a stupid proposal. We could have a fight. Whichever of us is able to beat the other up to the 
point where they either give up or expire gets the dispute decided in their favour. This way of 
settling disputes is messed up. Why is it messed up? Well here is a natural thought. Trial by 
combat is messed up because it fails to track justice. When people have these kinds of 
disputes some of them are in the right and some are in the wrong and there is absolutely no 
reason to believe that being in the right remotely likely to correlate with being big and strong 
and having excellent combat skills. 
Of course justice is a very thick concept, one where the normative and the prosaically factual 
are again entangled. So sometimes it may be very straightforward why trial by combat is 
messed up. In a case here you say I have wronged you and I say I did not, sometimes the 
disagreement is straightforwardly factual. You say I took money from your wallet and spent 
it on sweets. I say I did not. Then when a jury use the epistemic virtues we hope they have to 
determine their verdict there is no problem. The truth is out there and we hope their 
deliberations manage to track it. But not all disputes about justice are of that sort. Sometimes 
it is not contested what my actions were but what is contested whether doing that, whatever it 
is we all agree I did, should be counted as wronging you. Perhaps I have captured you and 
made you my slave. Perhaps I forced myself upon you sexually at a time when we were 
married to each other. Many people have believed that these things are not wrong. Some 
people still do. But the moral mainstream at least, in the cultural setting we inhabit, has 
abandoned these beliefs. Mob psychology? Or some rational progress of a kind that is clearly 
superior to combat as a decision procedure? And if the latter, in virtue of what? 
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+HUH¶VKRZThe process we use to determine what we believe has to be attentive in the right 
ways to the right things. Suppose that Ian is a morally immature 13-year old and as such is 
greatly addicted to bullying the puny and rather funny-looking Mark. Two years later Ian has 
become a far more morally mature young man, has ceased to bully Mark or anyone else and 
looks back on having done so with some shame and regret. What has happened to him, we 
might conjecture, is a shift in the sort of things he pays attention to and the kind of relevance 
that he attaches to them. He used to pay very little attention to the question of how his 
behaviour might make Mark feel. He used to pay a lot of attention to whether Mark¶s 
responses to his behaviour were, by his then 13-year-ROGER\¶VOLJKWVDPXVLQJHe now pays 
enough attention to how his ill-treatment made Mark feel to realize it made Mark feel 
extreme distress and thinks this has a moral significance that renders any question of whether 
0DUN¶VUHVSRQVes are amusing, simply of no moral relevance. This, it seems to me, is clearly 
an improving change in Ian. Or go back to my earlier example. Suppose I make you my 
slave, believing this is OK. Someone might say, I should not think that. I should attend to the 
impact of my doing this on your welfare and on your autonomy. But I might disagree. 
Considerations of your welfare and your autonomy have, I suggest, little or no weight 
because of certain characteristics you have, in particular, that you belong to a certain racial 
group. So there¶VQRJUHDWQHHGIRUPHWRDWWHQGWRWKDWIf you can get me to see that this is a 
mistake, that your racial membership does not have the sort of significance I think it does, we 
make moral progress. It is not a feature of you, I now see, that could ever warrant my 
withholding attention from what my treatment of you is costing in terms of your welfare and 
liberty. We do well, then, when we attend to the right things, badly when we do not. It is not 
always easy to be clear what those things are, but whatever they are, they are things to which 
the outcome of trial by combat has no sensitivity whatever. And that is why trial by combat is 
a stupid way of solving a moral dispute.  
The worry you may now be having is that I seem to have spent the last paragraph not so 
much doing moral epistemology as simply moralizing. But I think that is a false dichotomy. 
We may sometimes be inclined to conceive of moral epistemology as a branch of something 
we call metaethics where that is an activity that stands, as it were, outside of ethics and 
reflects, from a detached, neutral perspective, on what on earth we are up to when we go in 
for it, without itself engaging in ethics. Like Blackburn and Gibbard, unlike, say, Dworkin, I 
think there is such an activity and occasionally dabble in it myself. But most of moral 
epistemology does not stand outside ethics in this way. Moral epistemology is the business of 
saying which ways of forming and exercising moral beliefs are messed up and which are 
good. And the only way to do that is to get stuck right in to first order ethical thinking. 
Because a central question to which moral epistemology is addressed, which are the good, 
which the bad ways of forming and revising beliefs, it is itself thoroughly ethical.29 So while 
the foregoing four sentences are morally neutral metaethical observations made from a 
standpoint detached from engaged ethical thought and those four sentences are about moral 
epistemology, most of moral epistemology, its main substance is simply a branch of ethics. 
The virtuous moral inquirer, we will find ourselves saying, attends to things like this, ignores 
                                                          
29
 Here I do find myself essentially in agreement with Dworkin: 
 
Our moral epistemology ± our account of good reasoning about moral matters  - must 
be an integrated rather than an Archimendean epistemology and must therefore be 
itself a substantive, first-order moral theory. [paragraph] We are always guilty of a 
kind of circularity. There is no way I can test the accuracy of my moral convictions 
except by deploying further moral convictions. (2011, p, 100)  
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things like that, gives things of this kind this sort of weight, accords things of that kind this 
kind of relevance. What happens when such admirable types get their heads together to 
discuss what the moral rules in their society will be, is, I submit, something very different to 
science but a great deal more morally impressive than the more disreputable manifestations 
of mob psychology.  
 
The method of reflective equilibrium, in the form in which I endorse it here is a form of 
coherence theory of how moral inquiry had best proceed. Rather more exactly, what matters 
on this account is the robustness of a normative judgement under pressure of scrutiny from 
our other normative judgements, roughly what Tiberius calls resilience.30 But that is not to 
say that either coherence or resilience should be seen as some kind of master value.31 That 
would be a bad misunderstanding. If coherence were all that mattered, we might sensibly 
choose it even at the cost of transforming ourselves into everything our present substantive 
values most dispose us to loathe. And of course that would not be sensible.  
  
The input to the method of reflective equilibrium consists32 in the moral sensibilities we bring 
to the moral conversation, in all the substantive detail shaped by our shared nature and our 
history. Moral truth is what survives such scrutiny but not what explains that survival. And as 
a value, it pulls no weight of its own in informing that scrutiny.33  
 
It need not at all follow that we are left unable to distinguish, in the moral case, between 
epistemic reasons and reasons of other kinds. Consider slum tourism. Is that a good way of 
LPSURYLQJRQH¶VPRUDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIH[WUHPHSRYHUW\ and the moral issues it raises? It is 
natural to say the question is ambiguous. And here what we perhaps want to say is that, well, 
epistemically, it may very well be a very good way to do this. Rather as my hacking into your 
phone and your private email would be an epistemically effective but morally appalling way 
to obtain information about your private life. But morally it perhaps is not. Is it perhaps a 
                                                          
30
 Tiberius 2007, pp. 190ff. 
31
 Hurley is admirably clear on this point.  
 
It is in deliberating about ends that an agent exercises his or her autonomy; the value 
of autonomy emerges immediately from the need for deliberation and the search for 
coherence... Though autonomy has a special role in relation to other values, and 
indeed in making human beings distinctive among animals as self-interpreting 
animals, or persons  it is still one value among others which may conflict with 
it.(1989, pp. 318-319.)  
32
 Among many other things, of course, where reflective equilibrium aspires, as it always 
should, to be wide.  
33
 Again cf. Dworkin 2011, esp. Part II. And cf. Tiberius 2007, p. 196: 
 
The facts must be appreciated²deemed relevant, weighed and compared in 
importance²to arrive at a normative verdict. The non-realist can say that there are 
norms for appreciation of the facts that draw on other values, ones whose authority 
does not have to be explained in terms of straightforward truth conduciveness. For 
example, norms of empathy, imagination, and courage might be employed to assess 
how a person appreciates the facts, and these norms may be grounded in an ideal of 
the person rather than in reliability. 
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problem for the view defended here that it cannot make this distinction?34 ,GRQ¶WWKLQNLWLV. 
Remember that for the quasi-realistZHGRQ¶WJHWWRKHOSRXUVHOYHVWRWUXWKDWWKHRXWVHW:H
need to earn the right to invoke it and we only get there after the philosophical; work is done. 
Only then do we end up in a position to speak the way realists do. But the point here is that 
we do then end up in just that position. So at that point we can go right ahead and say the 
problem with slum tourism is that, while it might be a great way of coming to understand and 
appreciate certain moral truths, it is a morally objectionable way to pursue that goal. 
Distinctively epistemic reasons speak in its favour but moral reasons do not. It may of course 
very properly be doubted that I have in fact done anywhere near enough in this short essay to 
earn the right to say such things but I hope I have make at least some progress and perhaps 
contributed to pointing a way for others. 
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